CVE DatabaseCVE-2010-2568
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CVE-2010-25687.8/HIGHCISA KEV

Microsoft Windows Shell Shortcut (.LNK/.PIF) Icon Parsing Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2010-2568)

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Affected Vendors
microsoft
Affected Components
windows, windows_server
Published Date
2010-07-22
CVSS v3.1
7.8
HIGH
EPSS (30d)
89.6%
FIRST.org
CISA KEV
Exploited

Executive & SecOps Summary

SECOPS ASSESSMENT
Affected Scope

Microsoft Windows XP SP3, Server 2003 SP2, Vista SP1/SP2, Server 2008 SP2/R2, and Windows 7

Impact

Local or remote attackers can execute arbitrary code with system privileges simply by tricking a user into viewing a folder containing a crafted .LNK or .PIF file

Mitigation

Apply the official Microsoft MS10-046 security patch immediately, or implement workarounds to disable shortcut icon rendering and block outbound SMB/WebDAV traffic

Affected Products & Version Scope

Windows XP SP3, Windows Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista SP1/SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2/R2, Windows 7

Remediation & Live Workaround Commands

PATCH & WORKAROUND

1. Official Patch & Version Upgrade Commands

Apply the official Microsoft Security Update MS10-046 (KB2286198). For legacy systems, ensure the Windows Update service is active and install the patch using the following commands:

powershell
# Ensure Windows Update Service is running
Set-Service -Name wuauserv -StartupType Automatic
Start-Service -Name wuauserv

# Install the specific security update using PSWindowsUpdate module
Install-Module PSWindowsUpdate -Force -Confirm:$false
Get-WindowsUpdate -KBArticleID KB2286198 -Install -AcceptAll -AutoReboot

2. Temporary Workaround & Hardening Configuration

If patching is not immediately feasible, disable the icon handler for .LNK and .PIF files in the Windows Registry to prevent automatic DLL loading.

powershell
# Backup and delete the IconHandler registry keys for .lnk and .pif files
# Note: This will cause shortcuts to display a generic icon instead of their custom icons
reg export 'HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\lnkfile\shellex\IconHandler' C:\Backup_LNK_IconHandler.reg /y
reg delete 'HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\lnkfile\shellex\IconHandler' /f

reg export 'HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\piffile\shellex\IconHandler' C:\Backup_PIF_IconHandler.reg /y
reg delete 'HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\piffile\shellex\IconHandler' /f

# Restart Windows Explorer to apply changes
taskkill /f /im explorer.exe
start explorer.exe

3. Log Audit & IoC Verification Commands

Use the following PowerShell script to scan directories for suspicious .LNK files pointing to remote UNC paths (SMB/WebDAV shares), which is a common indicator of compromise.

powershell
# Scan user profiles for .LNK files pointing to remote network shares
$sh = New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell
Get-ChildItem -Path 'C:\Users' -Filter *.lnk -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
    try {
        $target = $sh.CreateShortcut($_.FullName).TargetPath
        if ($target -like '\\*') {
            Write-Host '[WARNING] Suspicious LNK pointing to UNC path found:' $_.FullName '->' $target -ForegroundColor Red
        }
    } catch {}
}
Interactive SecOps Remediation Checklist
0/4 (0%)
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Technical Root Cause & Exploitation Mechanics

1. Vulnerability Overview & Root Cause

This vulnerability exists in the way Windows Shell (Shell32.dll) parses and displays icons for shortcut files (.LNK and .PIF). When Windows Explorer displays a folder, it automatically attempts to resolve and render the icon associated with each shortcut file. To do this, the Windows Shell calls the LoadLibraryW API to load the executable or DLL containing the icon resource. However, Windows Shell fails to properly validate the file path of the icon resource, allowing an attacker to specify an arbitrary dynamic link library (DLL) instead of a legitimate icon file, leading to automatic execution of malicious code.

2. Exploitation Mechanics & Attack Scenario

An attacker crafts a malicious .LNK or .PIF file where the icon location property points to a malicious DLL hosted on a local drive, a removable USB drive, or a remote network share (SMB/WebDAV).

  • Delivery: The attacker delivers the crafted shortcut file and the malicious DLL to the target system via email attachments, malicious WebDAV shares, or physical USB drives.
  • Trigger: The vulnerability is triggered automatically when the user opens the directory containing the malicious shortcut file using Windows Explorer, or when a USB drive is inserted and parsed by the OS.
  • Execution: The Windows Shell attempts to render the shortcut's icon, loads the attacker's DLL into the Explorer process memory, and executes the payload (typically within DllMain) without any further user interaction. This technique was famously utilized by the Stuxnet worm to compromise air-gapped SCADA systems.

3. Infrastructure & Business Impact

Because this vulnerability requires minimal user interaction (simply viewing a folder) and has a high EPSS score (0.8962) along with active exploitation history (CISA KEV), it poses an extreme threat to enterprise environments. If an attacker places a malicious shortcut on a shared network drive, any employee browsing that directory will trigger the exploit, enabling rapid lateral movement across the internal network. For critical infrastructure running legacy Windows operating systems, this vulnerability can lead to complete system compromise, operational downtime, and industrial espionage.

Official Vendor Advisories & References

NVD Original English Description

Windows Shell in Microsoft Windows XP SP3, Server 2003 SP2, Vista SP1 and SP2, Server 2008 SP2 and R2, and Windows 7 allows local users or remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted (1) .LNK or (2) .PIF shortcut file, which is not properly handled during icon display in Windows Explorer, as demonstrated in the wild in July 2010, and originally reported for malware that leverages CVE-2010-2772 in Siemens WinCC SCADA systems.

Frequently Asked SecOps Questions (CVE-2010-2568)

FAQ

Q1. How critical is CVE-2010-2568 and is it actively exploited in the wild?

CVE-2010-2568 is rated CVSS 7.8 (HIGH) with a 30-day EPSS exploitation probability of 89.6%. It is listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, requiring immediate emergency remediation.

Q2. Which vendors and products are affected by CVE-2010-2568?

Primary impacted vendors include microsoft across windows, windows_server. Scope summary: Windows XP SP3, Windows Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista SP1/SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2/R2, Windows 7

Q3. What temporary mitigations or workarounds exist for CVE-2010-2568 before patching?

[Mitigation] Apply the official Microsoft MS10-046 security patch immediately, or implement workarounds to disable shortcut icon rendering and block outbound SMB/WebDAV traffic Follow the CLI remediation commands and interactive SecOps checklist on this page to restrict exposure prior to your maintenance window.

SECOPS WORKBENCH INTEGRATION

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CVE-2010-2568 Microsoft Windows Shell Shortcut (.LNK/.PIF) Icon Parsing Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2010-2568) (CVSS 7.8) - Patch & Workaround | CVE Pulse